

How the massacre was carried out:

Tier One – Formation of the Uprising (December 28 – 30):

The initial protests began among Tehran’s bazaar merchants in response to a sudden increase in the exchange rate and quickly spread to other provinces. In accordance with the Supreme National Security Council’s directives, the regime’s repressive forces attempted to suppress the protests by declaring a “law-and-order” situation and deploying police forces.

Tier Two – Expansion & Intensification (Dec 31, 2025–Jan 7, 2026)

The protests expanded to most provinces and gained momentum with the participation of organized youth groups. In response, authorities escalated repression and transferred operational command to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), designating the situation as a “security (non-armed)” condition.

Tier Three – Peak Mobilization and Armed Repression (Jan 8 – 11):

As demonstrations assumed nationwide dimensions, authorities implemented widespread internet and mobile communication shutdowns starting 9:00 pm on January 8th. This was followed by the use of live ammunition and pellet fire against protesters. Under the regime’s four-tier security classification system, the situation was formally designated as a “security (armed)” condition.

Maintaining Repression and Continued Protests (since Jan 12):

Despite extensive lethal force employed in multiple cities, reports indicate that protests continued in a fragmented and localized manner, suggesting sustained public discontent and continued mobilization at a lower intensity.

According to a directive issued on January 12, 2026 by the regime’s Supreme National Security Council, addressed to provincial governorates, a committee composed of MOIS (the Ministry of Intelligence), the governors’ political deputies, the Martyrs Foundation, the IRGC, and State Security Forces must reach a consensus on who they designate as a “martyr” (meaning a regime supporter allegedly killed by opposition forces). The purpose is to blame the massacre of the people on opposition groups and foreign elements.


Based on this, in the regime’s Martyrs Foundation statistics—out of more than 3,000 total deaths announced in connection with the uprising—2,427 were labelled as “martyrs” (including members of the repressive forces and regime supporters).

Advanced Planning Endorsed by the Supreme Leader

Directive by the National Security Council, approved by the Supreme Leader:

The document pertaining to the National Security Council (within the Ministry of Interior), which is classified as *Top Secret*, was issued on March 3, 2021. This document contains the resolutions of the regime’s Supreme National Security Council, which were also approved by Khamenei personally. It was prepared based on the regime’s experience in suppressing the 2019 uprising. The repression of the January 2026 uprising has been carried out by the regime’s security and suppressive organs, in accordance with these same guidelines.

کدخ: ۱۳۹۹/۱۳/۱۳
شماره: ۶۳۷۷۰
پست: خلیج حرمانه



شورای امنیت کشور

بسمان

استانداران و روسای محترم شورای تامین استان‌های سراسر کشور

سلام علیکم

با احترام، به پیوست جداول وضعیت‌های چهارگانه، انتظامی و امنیتی متضمن تعریف، مرجع تشخیص و وظایف و اختیارات دستگاه‌های ذربط ابلاغی دبیر محترم شورای عالی امنیت ملی ارسال می‌گردد. لطفاً دستور فرمایید ضمن اجرای جداول ابلاغی به مدت دو سال، نسبت به اطلاع‌رسانی، آموزش و تبیین مفاد آن در دستگاه‌های ذربط اقدام نمایند.

شایان ذکر است جداول مذکور در جلسات متعدد دبیرخانه شورای عالی امنیت ملی با حضور مسئولان و نمایندگان دستگاه‌های لشکری و کشوری از جمله دبیرخانه شورای امنیت کشور تدوین و جمع‌بندی آن به محضر مقام معظم رهبری (مدظله العالی) جهت اخذ تدبیر تقدیم گردید که معظم‌له مرقوم فرمودند « فعلاً برای دو سال این جمع بندی ابلاغ شود».

حسین ذوالفقاری
معاون امنیتی و انتظامی
و دبیر شورای امنیت کشور

گیرندگان الف:

- وزارت اطلاعات - معاون محترم اطلاعات سیاسی، فرهنگی و اجتماعی جهت دستور اقدام لازم.

گیرندگان ب:

- سردار معاون محترم اطلاعات و امنیت ستاد کل نیروهای مسلح جهت دستور اقدام لازم.
- سردار فرمانده محترم نیروی انتظامی جمهوری اسلامی ایران جهت دستور اقدام لازم.
- سردار معاون محترم عملیات سپاه پاسداران انقلاب اسلامی جهت دستور اقدام لازم.

رونوشت:

- جناب آقای دکتر رحمانی‌فصلی - وزیر محترم کشور و رئیس شورای امنیت کشور جهت استحضار.
- جناب آقای میرزایی‌انسل - مدیر کل محترم امنیتی جهت پیگیری.

خلیج حرمانه

Excerpts from the above Top-Secret document

Ministry of Interior–National Security Council –13 Esfand 1399 (3 March 2021)

Respected Governors and Heads of the Provincial Security Councils across the country,

Attached, please find the tables of the four law-enforcement and security status levels, including their definitions, the competent authority for determining them, and the duties and authorities of the relevant agencies, as communicated by the Supreme National Security Council.

...The aforementioned tables were drafted and consolidated in multiple sessions of the Secretariat of the Supreme National Security Council, with the presence of officials and representatives from military and civilian agencies, including the Secretariat of the National Security Council. The final compilation was then submitted to the Office of the Supreme Leader for his guidance, and His Eminence wrote: “For now, this compilation should be communicated for two years.” (see Appendix I)

Regarding the three phases that the January 2026 uprising went through, based on the regime’s internal document, the situation in each stage can be assessed as follows: the first three days were under a law-enforcement/public order situation, the following days under a security situation (non-armed), and from January 8 onward, the situation shifted to a security situation (armed)—the phase of armed repression. In both security phases, the IRGC played the command role and carried out armed killings.

Audio of Tehran Province Security Council Meeting is Revealing:

An audio document from the Tehran Province Security Council, held on April 28, 2025, features the Minister of Intelligence, Esmail Khatib, along with his deputies and accompanying officials. In different segments of the meeting, various units and officials, together with the Minister, present their annual performance reports for 1403 (March 2024-March 2025).

The content of their report indicates that, despite the likelihood of protests and unrest, the regime’s security apparatus claims it has been able to control and prevent the possibility of the resurgence of the protests. The intelligence minister warns that the main preoccupation of the Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei, is the impact of the social and economic crisis, which could lead to major upheavals. (see Appendix II)

The classified document of the Sarallah Headquarters



The classified document of the Sarallah Headquarters, consisting of 129 pages and 10 chapters, shows that Sarallah is the most important suppression headquarters at the national level because it controls the capital region, including the provinces of Tehran and Alborz. The content of this

document demonstrates that the headquarters examined every aspect of the country in minute detail to prevent an uprising, but it failed. Some pages of the document, along with their text, are cited in Appendix III.

The “Top Secret” Resilience Document ...

This document, on the one hand, shows that the regime’s Supreme National Security Council has assessed the threat posed by fluctuations in the exchange rate as the most important cause of public dissatisfaction, yet it is unable to control it. It also reflects the regime’s fear of social unrest, as well as its fear of the activities of the Resistance Units. (see Appendix IV)

Notable Characteristics of the 2026 Uprising

Intensified Domestic Hatred of the Regime:

According to assessments attributed to senior regime officials, including the secretary for the National Security Council, protests occurred in more than 400 cities, over 100 locations in Tehran, and approximately 1,000 sites nationwide, indicating a broad geographic spread of unrest and increasing societal opposition.

Temporary Liberation of Some Cities by the People:

During the uprising, protesters reportedly gained temporary control over parts of several cities, representing a notable development compared to prior protest movements. Locations cited include Malekshahi and Abdanan (Ilam Province), Marvdasht (Fars Province), parts of Karaj (west of Tehran), Rasht (Gilan Province), and areas within Isfahan Province.

People Ready to Fight Back

A new phenomenon in the 2026 uprising in Iran is the willingness among the people, especially the youth, to stand up to the repressive forces. The brutal suppression and mass killings have increased the willingness to fight back. So, while mass protests have not been possible, other forms of confrontation continue. The root causes of the uprising have intensified.

Emergence of Organizational Patterns:

Eyewitness accounts describe the formation of coordinated frontline groups facilitating crowd movement and engagement with security forces. A witness report from Mashhad states: *“The people’s method of confrontation was usually a 50-person group at the front. They opened the way; these were the line-breakers and highly skilled... They truly were the heart of the crowd; when these hearts were struck, the crowd lost its strength and dispersed.”*

A report from Bandar Abbas notes: *“At first, we weren’t even 20 people, and no one knew what to do. Within minutes of moving, believe me, we reached 1,000 people.”*

Increased Risk Acceptance:

Reports indicate heightened willingness among protesters to accept personal risk and engage in all-out confrontation with the repressive forces, despite ongoing lethal force. One report states: *“In Isfahan, a mother and her two daughters say goodbye to each other every day, expecting martyrdom. Over two consecutive days, the daughters were hit by pellet shots, yet they still joined the uprising the following day.”*

Necessity of Self-Defence:

In dozens of reports from various cities—especially cities or areas that were temporarily liberated by the people—it is stated that IRGC forces were able to push people back through opening fire on young protesters and carrying out large-scale killings. After witnessing the deaths

of many of their friends, the uprising's young participants have concluded that the only way to confront the heavily armed IRGC is through organized struggle and armed self-defense, in order to prevent the massacre of the people and liberate the cities from the occupying repressive forces.

Presence of Organized Resistance – Key Role of Resistance Units

The uprising has underscored the central role of organization in confronting a heavily militarized state apparatus. The emergence of defiant youths as a major force distinguishes these protests from previous ones. In this respect, the MEK network inside Iran, especially the Resistance Units, played a vital role in organizing, coordinating, and guiding the protests to be focused on demanding an end to dictatorship, as well as maintaining the momentum for protests to continue, and finally, in many instances, protecting protestors by confronting the repressive forces.

The experience of the January uprising has led participants to recognize the need for improved coordination, structure, and continuity to withstand repression.

There are many cases of MEK resistance units paying the ultimate price and sacrificing their lives for freedom during the uprising.

Naim Abdollahi, 34, a professor at Tehran University, PhD in law, and a member of the MEK Resistance Units, is one such example.

Naim gained experience during his participation in the 2017, 2019, and 2022 uprisings.

He was jailed and expelled from academia for organising students—yet never stopped resisting.

He played a leading role during the January 2026 uprising in Tehran and was shot dead by Iran's regime on 8 January 2026.



Zahra (Raha) Bohlouli-Pour, 18, a linguistics major at Tehran University, exemplified the courage of Iran's Gen Z.

Zahra and her fellow freedom fighters were members of the MEK Resistance Units network, which was very active during the Iranian uprising.

She played a leading role during the January 2026 uprising in Tehran and was shot dead by Iran's regime on 8 January 2026.

What is Ahead

The post–December 28 environment represents a fundamental rupture with the previous status quo. For both society and the ruling establishment, a return to pre-uprising conditions appears unlikely for two reasons.

Worsening Socio-Economic Conditions as the Structural Basis

The economic hardship and inflation that initially triggered the uprising persist, and available evidence indicates that the authorities lack the capacity to address even basic socioeconomic grievances. As a result, structural drivers of public discontent remain firmly in place and are likely to intensify over time.

The underlying social and political volatility of Iranian society has been further intensified by large-scale loss of life, deepening grievances, and the collective memory of violence.

The Organized Resistance is Battle-Tested

The presence of an organized resistance network—having acquired significant operational experience through sustained confrontation with the IRGC and other security institutions—constitutes a continuing and adaptive force within the protest landscape.

There is no scape for the regime to survive

The current situation bears similarities to the final phase of the Shah’s regime, which ultimately collapsed after approximately 18 months of sustained unrest. While historical contexts differ, the comparison underscores the possibility of a prolonged period of instability that could lead to profound political change.

The Role of the International Community

The responsibility of the international community is clear. Stand on the right side of history—alongside a people who are paying the price of freedom with their own blood, by taking the following steps.

1. Raise the cost of repression through targeted sanctions, especially by halting oil exports.
2. Pursue legal accountability for the architects of crimes against humanity. Expel the regime’s security agents.
3. Recognize the right of the people and youth to resist and confront the IRGC.

The Transitional Period

The transfer of sovereignty from dictatorship to the people can take place in an orderly, peaceful, democratic, and law-based manner, because there exists a political and executive framework for “the day after,” and that is precisely what the NCRI has prepared for years.

The NCRI has adopted clear, public, and binding plans for the transitional period and the establishment of popular sovereignty. Under these plans, immediately after the regime’s overthrow, a provisional government will be formed to hold free, fair, and universal elections for a Constituent Assembly within a maximum of six months.

Once convened, all political power is transferred to the people’s elected representatives, who will both select the final transitional government and draft and submit to a referendum the constitution of the new Republic of Iran.

The fundamental principles of future Iran, including complete gender equality in all its facets, separation of religion and state, recognition of the rights of nationalities, including autonomy for Iranian Kurdistan, independence of the judiciary, freedom of parties, have been ratified.

This program is not merely theoretical. It rests on the resistance’s broad social base and a vast network of thousands of experts, academics, and professionals in Iran and abroad. Specialized working groups on the economy, law, energy, education, health, environment, institutional reconstruction, transitional justice and security, are continuously preparing for implementation so that post-dictatorship Iran can enter a new era without a power vacuum or instability.

This vision enjoys the backing of more than 4,000 parliamentarians and 125 former heads of state and government worldwide. Iran’s transition to a democratic republic will not be a leap into the dark, but a conscious step toward stability, freedom, and the rule of law.

Appendix I

National Security Council Top Secret Directive

شورای امنیت کشور

جمهوری اسلامی ایران
وزارت کشور

تاریخ: ۱۳۹۹/۱۲/۱۳
شماره: ۶۳۷۷۰
بوست: خلیج محرمانه

بسم الله الرحمن الرحیم

استانداران و روسای محترم شورای تامین استان‌های سراسر کشور

سلام علیکم

با احترام، به پیوست جداول وضعیت‌های چهارگانه انتظامی و امنیتی متضمن تعریف، مرجع تشخیص و وظایف و اختیارات دستگاه‌های ذیربط ابلاغی دبیر محترم شورای عالی امنیت ملی ارسال می‌گردد. لطفاً دستور فرمایید ضمن اجرای جداول ابلاغی به مدت دو سال، نسبت به اطلاع‌رسانی، آموزش و تبیین مفاد آن در دستگاه‌های ذیربط اقدام نمایند.

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- سردار معاون محترم عملیات سپاه پاسداران انقلاب اسلامی جهت دستور اقدام لازم

رونوشت:

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- جناب آقای میرزایی‌اصل - مدیر کل محترم امنیتی جهت پیگیری

خلیج محرمانه

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خیلی محترمانه

ملاحظات	همکار	مسئول	مرجع تشخیص و سیاستگذاری	تعریف	شرایط و وضعیت
<p>با توجه به سرعت در تبدیل وضعیت انتظامی به امنیتی، سپاه مترصد و آماده برای پذیرش مسئولیت رده‌های ذی‌نقش در وضعیت امنیتی می‌باشد.</p> <p>گردان‌ها (یا هر واحد عملیاتی بسیج) با فرماندهی و سازمان یکپارچه در کنترل عملیاتی ناجا قرار می‌گیرند و هدایت گردان‌ها (یا واحد عملیاتی) توسط فرمانده مربوط انجام می‌شود.</p> <p>(ناجا) مجاز به تجزیه گردان‌ها یا واحدهای عملیاتی و بکارگیری جزء به جزء آن نمی‌باشد.</p> <p>در وضعیت انتظامی سایر بخش‌های دولتی و نهادهای عمومی و غیردولتی مورد نیاز هستند شهرداری‌ها و ... با تصویب شورای تأمین مربوطه با ابلاغ رئیس شورای تأمین ذی‌ربط برای اجرای وظایف ذاتی در کنترل عملیاتی ناجا قرار می‌گیرند.</p> <p>تیم‌ها: در هر شرایطی چنانچه به مراکز نظمی و انتظامی حمله صورت گیرد، آنها حق دفاع مسلحانه را دارند.</p>	سپاه واجا	فرماندهی در وضعیت‌های الف و ب با ناجا و در وضعیت ج با سپاه می‌باشد	<p>شاک‌شده شدن</p> <p>توضیح: در وضعیت انتظامی چنانچه حجم و شدت اتفاقات در یک یا چند شهرستان از یک استان از حد انتظامی به امنیتی سوق پیدا کند، شاک می‌تواند در آن شهرستان وضعیت امنیتی اعلام کرده و شرایط را به شاک اطلاع رسمی نماید. اعلام وضعیت امنیتی تا هفت استان با شاک می‌باشد و شرایط را به دبیرخانه شمام اعلام می‌دارد. همچنین اعلام وضعیت امنیتی در تهران با پیشنهاد شورای امنیت کشور و با تصویب شمام انجام خواهد شد.</p> <p>وضعیت امنیتی در بین ۱۰ استان با پیشنهاد شورای امنیت کشور و تصویب شمام اعلام خواهد شد.</p>	<p>الف) حوادث یا تهدیدات در حدی است که ناجا با توان و استعداد خود قادر به مقابله و مدیریت حادثه می‌باشند.</p> <p>ب) در صورت افزایش نسبی شدت، مدت و وسعت و نیز گستردگی و سازمان‌یافتگی تهدیدات و اعلام نیاز ناجا به همکاری و کمک؛ سپاه با تأمین نیازهای اطلاعاتی و تحت کنترل قرار دادن گردان‌های بسیج و امکانات نیرویی و تجهیزاتی مورد نیاز؛ از ناجا پشتیبانی عملیاتی به عمل می‌آورد. (هم‌زمان بنا به مورد به شاک، شاک، شستن اطلاع رسمی گردد)</p> <p>ج) در شرایطی که در صحنه اتفاقات، ناجا حضور ندارد و یا ناجا واحدی (کافی) برای مقابله دار اختیار ندارد. (به جهت از دست ندادن زمان) سپاه به درخواست ناجا و یا بنا بر اعلام فرمانده سپاه و یا هر یک از اعضای شوراهای شاک، شتا و شستن با تشخیص ریاست شورای مربوطه ریسک ضعیف، واژده عمل می‌گردند چنانچه ریسک شورای شهرستان به موقع اقدام نمود مسئولیت اقدام برعهده استندار می‌باشد. در این شرایط مسئولیت صحنه با سپاه بوده و اعلام رفع تهدید برای واگذاری مسئولیت به ناجا در سطح استان برعهده شاک و در سطح شهرستان برعهده شتا و در سطح کشور با شمام می‌باشد. (به جز استان تهران که تابع شرایط و دستورالعمل‌های مربوطه است)</p>	<p>شرایطی است که امنیت عمومی جامعه یا بخشی از حوادث و یا تهدیدات امنیتی دچار اختلال شده است در این شرایط:</p>

Excerpt from the above document

Status Condition: Law-Enforcement Situation

Definition: A condition in which public security has been disrupted due to incidents or security threats...

Responsible Authority: Command in levels A and B is with NAJA, and in level C with the IRGC.

Supporting Agencies: IRGC and VAJA (Ministry of Intelligence)

خیلی محصورانه

شرایط و وضعیت	تعریف	مرجع تشخیص و سیاستگذاری	مسئول	همکار	ملاحظات
وضعیت امنیتی (مستقلانه)	شرایطی است که گروه‌های ضد انقلاب و یا جریان‌های معاند نظام و یا آتش‌سازگران یا قتل‌گرازان و یا - با هدف براندازی یا نقض حاکمیت یا ایجاد بحران هدف سیاسی یا امنیتی یا اجتماعی در کشور یا بخشی از کشور یا توسط به قوه قهریه اقدام به شورش یا آتش‌سازش یا خرابکاری و یا هرگونه اقدام خشونت آمیز می‌نمایند، لیکن اقدامات سازماندهی شده صورت نمی‌دهند لذا مقابله با آن نیز غیر مسلحانه می‌باشد (مانند روزهای اوج فتنه در سال ۸۸) تصریح: در هر شرایط چنانچه به مراکز نظامی و اطلاعاتی حمله صورت گیرد، آنها حق دفاع مسلحانه را دارند.	۱- چنانچه حجم و شدت آفتاب‌سازش در یک یا چند شهرستان از حد انتظامی به امنیتی تغییر پیدا کند شورای تأمین استان پس از بررسی اوضاع در شورا، در آن مناطق با هماهنگی و اطلاع شاک وضعیت امنیتی اعلام نماید. ۲- چنانچه حجم و شدت آفتاب‌سازش در یک یا چند استان از حد انتظامی به امنیتی تغییر یابد، شورای امنیت کشور ضمن بررسی اوضاع در شورا، در آن مناطق با هماهنگی و اطلاع شام وضعیت امنیتی اعلام کند. ۳- چنانچه حجم و شدت آفتاب‌سازش در تهران، از حد انتظامی به امنیتی تغییر یابد با پیشنهاد شورای امنیت کشور و تصویب شام وضعیت امنیتی اعلام خواهد شد. ۴- وضعیت امنیتی در بیش از هفت استان با پیشنهاد شورای امنیت کشور و تصویب شام اعلام خواهد شد. مسئولیت مأموریت‌ها و اقدامات به اقتضای این وضعیت به سپاه پاسداران واگذار خواهد شد. آشاک و شتا و شش در این شرایط ضمن ادامه مسئولیت‌های خود در حوزه امنیت عمومی مسئولیت هماهنگی اقدامات بخش‌های کشوری با سپاه را برعهده دارند. ۲- شاک و شتا و شش در این شرایط در خصوص مقابله با تهدیدات این وضعیت غیر عملیاتی هستند. در این وضعیت فرماندهی سپاه پاسداران در سطوح مختلف موظفند به طور مستمر و به موقع روند بحران و نحوه مقابله با آن را بنا به مورد به شش، شتا، شاک گزارش نمایند. ۴- سیاست‌گذاری و تعیین خط‌مشی‌های کلی، راهبردی و حاکمیتی در شرایط امنیتی با دبیرخانه شام می‌باشد.	سپاه	ناجا و واجا در کنترل عملیاتی سپاه پاسداران قرار خواهد شد گرفت.	تا تصویب و ابلاغ رسمی، توسط مراجع تعیین شده، سپاه پاسداران ضمن هماهنگی با مراجع مذکور در چارچوب وظایف ذاتی مسئولیت کنترل صحنه را به عهده خواهد داشت و اقدامات لازم را برای جلوگیری از گسترش و برقراری امنیت بعمل خواهد آورد. یگان‌های عملیاتی و مربوطه (مورد نیاز) از ناجا و رده‌های ذی‌نفع واجا و سایر بخش‌های دولتی و نهادهای عمومی و غیر دولتی مورد نیاز هستند شهرداری‌ها و - در چارچوب وظایف ذاتی در کنترل عملیاتی سپاه پاسداران قرار خواهند گرفت. سپاه پاسداران اقدامات خود را به شاک و شتا و شش صرفاً اطلاع می‌دهد (مستور نمی‌گیرد) لازم به ذکر است هدایت عملیاتی سپاه پاسداران در این وضعیت بر عهده ستادکل نیروهای مسلح است.

Status Condition: Security Situation (Non-Armed)

Responsible Authority: Command in levels A and B is with NAJA, and in level C with the IRGC.

Supporting Agencies: IRGC and VAJA

خیلی محصورانه

شرایط و وضعیت	تعریف	مرجع تشخیص و سیاستگذاری	مسئول	همکار	ملاحظات
وضعیت امنیتی (مستقلانه)	وضعیتی است که امنیت داخلی به علت توسعه آفتاب‌سازش به شدت مخدوش شده و اقدامات تروریستی مسلحانه صورت گرفته و بر شدت با هدف براندازی نظام سیاسی یا اختلال جدی در امنیت کشور یا بخشی از کشور در حال انجام است (مانند اقدامات متناقض و شرایط سال ۱۳۶۰)	به منظور مسرعت عمل و جلوگیری از اقدامات تروریستی، شورای تأمین استان با هماهنگی و اطلاع شاک همزمان ضمن واگذاری مأموریت به سپاه مراتب را به رئیس شاک اعلام تا برای تصویب به شام منعکس نماید. (سیاست‌گذاری و تعیین خط‌مشی‌های کلی، راهبردی و حاکمیتی در این شرایط بر عهده دبیرخانه شام می‌باشد) شاک و شتا و شش در این شرایط ضمن ادامه مسئولیت‌های خود در حوزه امنیت عمومی مسئولیت هماهنگی اقدامات بخش‌های کشوری با سپاه پاسداران را بر عهده دارند. شاک، شتا و شش در این شرایط در خصوص مقابله با تهدیدات این وضعیت غیر عملیاتی هستند در این وضعیت فرماندهی سپاه پاسداران در سطوح مختلف موظفند به طور مستمر و به موقع روند بحران و نحوه مقابله با آن را بنا به مورد به شش، شتا و شاک گزارش نمایند.	مسئولیت اقدامات به اقتضای این وضعیت با سپاه پاسداران است گیرند	ناجا واجا و سایر سازمان‌های ذی‌ربط لشکری و کشوری در این وضعیت با سپاه پاسداران قرار می گیرند	مسئولیت این شرایط بر عهده سپاه پاسداران است و وزیر اطلاعات بایستی نماینده خود را (که بتواند به مدیران کل استان‌های مربوطه امر و نهی داشته باشد) به فرارگاه معرفی نماید. هدایت عملیاتی سپاه پاسداران با ستادکل نیروهای مسلح می‌باشد
وضعیت امنیتی (مستقلانه)	شرایط به گونه‌ای است که منطبق با مناطقی از کشور توسط گروه‌های معاند یا تروریستی سازماندهی شده بصورت مسلحانه در معرض تصرف قرار داده و یا به تصرف درآورده است. در این شرایط سپاه بدون فوت وقت و در چارچوب وظایف ذاتی با کنترل عملیاتی گرفتن ناجا و واجا و سازمان‌های کشوری در منطقه مربوطه به مأموریت مقابله با تهاجم و برقراری امنیت می‌پردازد و همزمان وضعیت را به رده‌های کشوری تأمین و سلسله‌مراتب فرماندهی اعلام می‌نماید.	با تصویب شام مسئولیت مأموریت و اقدامات به اقتضای این وضعیت به سپاه واگذار می‌شود. (سیاست‌گذاری و تعیین خط‌مشی‌های کلی، راهبردی و حاکمیتی در این شرایط بر عهده دبیرخانه شام می‌باشد) شاک و شتا و شش در این شرایط ضمن ادامه مسئولیت‌های خود در حوزه امنیت عمومی، مسئولیت هماهنگی اقدامات بخش‌های کشوری متناسب با اقتضای شرایط امنیتی با سپاه را برعهده دارند. شاک، شتا و شش در این شرایط در خصوص مقابله با تهدیدات این وضعیت غیر عملیاتی هستند اما وضعیت بحران و نحوه مقابله با آن باید توسط رده فرماندهی سپاه مربوطه به آن‌ها گزارش شود.	مسئولیت اقدامات به اقتضای این وضعیت با سپاه پاسداران اسلامی گیرند	ناجا واجا و سایر سازمان‌های ذی‌ربط لشکری و کشوری در کنترل عملیاتی سپاه پاسداران قرار می گیرند	مسئولیت این شرایط بر عهده سپاه پاسداران است و وزیر اطلاعات بایستی نماینده خود را (که بتواند به مدیران کل استان‌های مربوطه امر و نهی داشته باشد) به فرارگاه معرفی نماید. هدایت عملیاتی سپاه پاسداران با ستادکل نیروهای مسلح می‌باشد

Status Condition: Security Situation (Armed)

Responsible Authority: IRGC

Supporting Agencies: IRGC, VAJA, and other relevant military and civilian organizations

ملاحظات اساسی در وضعیت امنیتی مسلحانه	
<p>۱- حفاظت از اماکن دارای طبقه بندی و دارای اهمیت یا نیروی انتظامی است اما وزارتخانه ها و سازمان ها موظف اند برای ارتقای ضریب حفاظتی و امنیتی دستگاه های ذی ربط با استفاده از ظرفیت حراست ها، و بسیج ادارات با ناجا همکاری کنند. (با توجه به مفاد بند ۵ ماده ۴ قانون ناجا)</p> <p>۲- ارتش جمهوری اسلامی ایران آمادگی داشته باشد، بنا به شرایط و وضعیت موجود بنا به درخواست فرمانده کل سپاه و با دستور ستادکل نیروهای مسلح برای حفاظت از اماکن دارای طبقه بندی و دارای اهمیت همانند وزارتخانه ها، سازمان ها و... تحت کنترل عملیاتی فرمانده میدان عمل نماید.</p> <p>۳- بنا به تصمیم و اعلام فرمانده قرارگاه امام علی (ع) استانی و مرکزی و نیز قرارگاه های امنیتی ثارالله و حضرت ابوالفضل (ع) و قرارگاه های منطقه ای حمزه و قدس یا یا فرمانده کل سپاه، وزارت ارتباطات و فن آوری اطلاعات موظف است نسبت به اعمال محدودیت اینترنت (قطع یا کندی ارتباط و...) در جغرافیای ناآرامی ها اقدام نماید.</p> <p>۴- دبیرخانه در چارچوب مصوبات جلسه ۲۹۸ شام، رسانه های مکتوب و مجازی را هدایت و راهبری مینماید.</p>	

Excerpt from the above document


Key Considerations in an Armed Security Situation

Based on the decision and announcement of the commander of the provincial and central **Imam Ali Headquarters**, as well as the **Sarallah Security Headquarters**, the **Hazrat Abolfazl Headquarters**, and the regional headquarters of **Hamzeh** and **Quds**, or by order of the IRGC Commander-in-Chief, the Ministry of Communications and Information Technology is obligated to impose internet restrictions (cutting or slowing connectivity, etc.) in the areas experiencing unrest.

Appendix II

Audio Tape of the Second session of the Provincial Security Council in the year 1404 – 28 April 2025

Revealing part of the audio clip of the second meeting of the security council of Tehran Province, attended by Minister of Intelligence Khatib, April 28, 2025



The transcript of the audio file is as follows:

Second session of the Provincial Security Council in the year 1404 – 28 April 2025

At the beginning of the session, we will be at the service of Mr. Governor, God willing, to introduce the subject, with a salutation upon Muhammad and the Family of Muhammad.

Governor Mohammad Sadegh Motamedian:

In the name of God, the Most Merciful. In addition, we would like to express our sincere gratitude to you in the presence of HazratHojjat-ul-Islam and Muslims, Mr. Khatib, Minister of Intelligence, deputies and accompanying delegation. Your presence is an honor for me in the council and I would like to sincerely thank you. At the beginning, allow me to introduce members of the Council. Then there are a few points there, there is a problem, then, God willing, I will contact you later.

Brig. Gen Hassanzadeh, Commander of Hazrat Rasoolullah Corps,

Mr. Rastegar, you know him already,

Mr. Khoshaghabal, former member of the Ministry of Intelligence, Deputy Governor and Special Commander of Tehran.

Mr. Soleimanpour is the Deputy Governor and Governor of Shar Rey.

Mr. Tavakoli, Governor of Shmiranat,

Mr. Aalami, Deputy Director of Radio and Television Organization and Director of Tehran Network, Channel 5 of Tehran,

Brig. Gen. Beigi, Director of Intelligence of Sarollah Base and a colleague in the Ministry of Intelligence,

Dr. Vaziri, Deputy Prosecutor of Tehran, and this is the first meeting is attending.

Mr. Eftekhari, Head of the Judicial Organization of the Armed Forces,

Mr. Shahkarami, Deputy Minister of Justice and you already know him,

Brig. Gen. Valizadeh, Commander of the IRGC units in province's cities,

Mr. Sadat, Director General of Security,

Mr. Amir.... Hariri, Deputy Chief of Intelligence of the Army of the Islamic Republic,

Brig. Gen. Al-Ghasi Mehr, Commander of East Tehran Police Force,

Brig. Gen. Azizi, Commander of West Tehran Police Force,

Brig. Gen. Mohammadian, Commander of Greater Tehran

Mr. Nayebi, Head of security in Governor Office,

And I am Motamedian, At the beginning, I would like to express my thanks for the efforts of the Provincial Security Council, thank God, they are good directors and commanders, last year, despite the estimate of all security services in the country indicated that there would be a possibility of a crisis in the final months of the year, but with the help of the intelligence we had from Tehran, good cooperation and the preemptive measures, four or five crises were managed.

I thank and appreciate, Dr. Motamedi, for presenting sum-up of the issue.

What Minister of Information said was very valuable. You read in the re[port and members of the council also mentioned, the cooperation of the members of the council and you as the Minister of Intelligence, this cooperation has been at the highest level since the beginning of the revolution.

I would like to thank you for your cooperation.

For the threats of 1404 (March 2025-March 2026), in various fields, both the Ministry of Intelligence, the IRGC, Sarollah Base, the Internal Security Forces, the judiciary, we predicted different scenarios. Recently, if I am not wrong, Sarollah Base held a good meeting with all (...) security at the presence of Brig. Gen. Bagheri, Brig. Gen. Salami, Brig. Gen. Radan and a good review was made for both last year's events and programs for the year 1404. We are prepared for them. Thank you for your presence and I would like to finish the meeting. Hopefully, we will have a meeting next week. Brig. Gen. Beigi...

Appendix III

The classified document of the Sarallah Headquarters



The classified document of **Sarallah Headquarters**, consisting of **129 pages** and **10 chapters**, shows that Sarallah is the most important suppression headquarters at the national level because it controls the capital region, including the provinces of **Tehran and Alborz**. The content of this document demonstrates that this headquarters examined all aspects of the country in the smallest details in order to prevent an uprising, but it did not succeed. (Some pages of the document along with their text are provided below.)

“Comprehensive Tehran Security Plan” — Sarallah Headquarters, Fall 2024

In a section of the Tharallah Headquarters document titled “**Plan for the Control and Management of Disruptive Social Groups**,” the main groups considered to be the regime’s number one enemy are identified. According to this definition, members of the **MEK**, as well as immediate family members of those who have been executed by the regime, are considered **Level-One enemies** of this regime, and criminal repressive plans have been designed to control them. (Some pages of the document along with their text are provided below.)

In a section of the Sarallah Headquarters document titled “**Plan for the Control and Management of High-Risk/Disruptive Social Groups**,” the main groups regarded as the regime’s number one enemies are identified. According to this definition, **members of the MEK**, as well as **immediate family members whose one of their relatives has been executed by the regime**, are considered **Level-One enemies** of this regime, and **criminal, repressive plans** have been devised to monitor and control these individuals.

Some pages of the document, along with their text, are provided below.

طرح کنترل و مدیریت انتشار آسیب را

ماده 1 : اهداف و منظورها :

الف - هدف :

ارتقاء اشراف اطلاعاتی (در حوزه محیطی، موضوعی و فردی) در محدوده سرزمینی قرارگاه ثارالله تهران

ب - منظور :

- 1- این شیوه ها و روشهای تامین نیازمندیهای اطلاعاتی در مدیریت صحیح و کارآمد اقصار آسیب زا
- 2- انسجام و هماهنگی اطلاعاتی میان قرارگاه ثارالله تهران و ناجا در جهت مدیریت اقصار آسیب زا
- 3- ایجاد بانک جامع اطلاعاتی فی مابین قرارگاه ثارالله تهران و ناجا در جهت افزایش اشراف اطلاعاتی بر اقصار آسیب زا در حوزه سرزمینی
- 4- پیش بینی، پیشگیری، کشف و خنثی سازی اقدامات ضد امنیتی اقصار آسیب زا در محدوده سرزمینی قرارگاه.
- 5- تعامل و هماهنگی در تبادل اخبار و اطلاعات در حوزه اقصار آسیب زا.

Excerpt from the above document

Plan for the Control and Management of High-Risk/Disruptive Social Groups

Article 1: Objectives and Purposes

A – Goal:

To enhance intelligence oversight and situational awareness (*environmental, operational/thematic, and individual*) within the territorial jurisdiction of **Sarallah Headquarters in Tehran**.

B – Purposes:

1. These procedures and methods are aimed at meeting intelligence requirements for the proper and effective management of high-risk/disruptive groups.
2. Intelligence integration and coordination between **Sarallah Headquarters in Tehran** and **NAJA** for managing high-risk/disruptive groups.
3. Establishing a comprehensive joint intelligence database between Sarallah Headquarters in Tehran and NAJA to increase intelligence dominance over high-risk/disruptive groups within the territorial jurisdiction.
4. Anticipating, preventing, detecting, and neutralizing anti-security actions by high-risk/disruptive groups within the headquarters' territorial jurisdiction.
5. Interaction and coordination in the exchange of news and intelligence regarding high-risk/disruptive groups.

× ماده 2 : سطوح امنیتی افسار آسیب زا :

• سطح یک :

- محکومین دادگاه های انقلاب به جرائم سازمان یافته و امنیتی یا اقدامات گروهی و ضدانقلاب .
- هواداران ، سmpادها ، توابعین و... گروهک های ضد انقلاب مسلح برانداز و جریانات سلفی تکفیری.
- خانواده و بستگان درجه یک عناصر گروهکی ضد انقلاب و خانواده معدومین گروهکی و ضد انقلاب .

Article 2: Security Levels of High-Risk/Disruptive Groups

• Level One:

- Individuals convicted by Revolutionary Courts of organized crimes and security-related offenses, or for actions linked to factional/organized groups and counter-revolutionary activity.
- Supporters, sympathizers, repentant collaborators, etc. of armed anti-regime counter-revolutionary groups and Salafi-Takfiri movements.
- Immediate family members and close relatives of counter-revolutionary group elements, as well as families of executed members of such groups.

× ماده 3 : فعالیت های عمده و اساسی در راستای کنترل و اشراف بر افسار آسیب زا براساس سطح امنیتی :

✓ اقدامات کنترلی و اشراف بر سطح یک افسار آسیب زا :

- 1) جمع آوری اطلاعات اولیه شامل : (مشخصات سجلی ، سوابق فعالیت گروهکی ، سوابق فعالیت میدانی) .
- 2) کنترل نوبه ای سوژه ها با توجه به سابقه اطلاعات جمع آوری شده و بروز رسانی بانک اطلاعاتی .
 - کنترل پرینت مکالمات تلفن و شماره تلفن افراد مرتبط براساس فراوانی تماس .
 - کنترل تحرکات سوژه در فضای مجازی و سایبر، آلوده سازی تلفن همراه سوژه ، نفوذ و هک شبکه های اجتماعی
 - انجام عملیات VIP بر روی شماره تماس های سوژه
 - انجام عملیات سایبری بر روی پست های الکترونیکی فرد
 - کنترل پیامک های ارسالی سوژه بصورت نوبه ای
 - کنترل فنی خطوط تلفن سوژه و مرتبطین درجه یک (اصل 25) .
 - کنترل های محیطی(فعالیت های میدانی (ت م) ، مرتبطین و میهمانان (...)
 - کنترل ترددات داخلی و خروج از کشور.
 - کنترل حساب های مالی
 - کنترل وضعیت معیشتی سوژه (تغییرات محسوس در زندگی)
 - کنترل وضعیت خانواده و وابستگان درجه یک از حیث : (اجتماعی ، سیاسی ، اخلاقی، اقتصادی و فرهنگی)
 - کنترل پلاک خودرو فرد از طریق سامان های پلاک خوان
 - کنترل فعالیت و حضور در زمان های : تجمع ، آشوب ، اغتشاشات و... بصورت فنی (سامانه جمال)
- 3) جذب منبع یا مخبرکنار سوژه(منزل یا محیط کار ، خانواده)
- 4) تجهیز فنی محیط کار و منزل در صورت دستیابی به تحرکات مخل امنیت .
- 5) انجام اقدام اطلاعاتی (احضار ، جلب ، بازرسی از محیط مرتبط و....) در صورت دستیابی به تحرکات مخل امنیت .

Article 3: Major and Essential Activities for Controlling and Monitoring High-Risk/Disruptive Groups Based on Security Level

☑ Control and surveillance measures for Level-One high-risk/disruptive individuals:

1. Collection of initial information, including: (*identity records, history of group-related activity, history of field operations*).
2. Periodic monitoring of targets based on previously collected information and updating the intelligence database. Including:
 - Monitoring phone call records and numbers of related individuals based on call frequency.
 - Monitoring the target's activities in cyberspace and on social media; infecting/compromising the target's mobile phone; and infiltrating and hacking social networks.
 - Conducting VIP operations on the target's phone numbers.
 - Conducting cyber operations on the individual's email accounts.
 - Periodic monitoring of the target's text messages (SMS).
 - Technical surveillance of the target's phone lines and those of immediate associates (*Article 25*).
 - Environmental monitoring (*field activities, associates, visitors, etc.*).
 - Monitoring domestic travel and international departures.
 - Monitoring financial accounts.
 - Monitoring the target's livelihood conditions (*noticeable lifestyle changes*).
 - Monitoring the status of immediate family members and dependents in terms of: (*social, political, moral, economic, and cultural aspects*).
 - Tracking the individual's vehicle license plate through plate-recognition systems.
 - Monitoring activity and presence during gatherings, unrest, riots, disturbances, etc., using technical means (*Jamal system*).
3. Recruiting a source or informant close to the target (*home, workplace, family*).
4. Installing technical surveillance equipment in the workplace and home if security-disruptive activity is detected.
5. Carrying out intelligence measures (*summons, arrest, inspection/search of related locations, etc.*) if security-disruptive activity is detected.

Appendix IV:

2.4. Explanations Regarding the “Top Secret” Resilience Document ...

This document, on the one hand, shows that the regime’s **Supreme National Security Council** has assessed the **threat posed by fluctuations in the exchange rate** as the most important cause of public dissatisfaction, yet it is **unable to control it**. It also reflects the regime’s fear of **social unrest**, as well as its fear of the activities of the **Resistance Units**. (Some pages of the document along with their text are provided below.)

بکلی سری

اقدامات انجام شده: براساس توضیحات بندهای فوق اقدام شده است.	
۷	پرهیز از اجرای هر گونه طرح تنش زا (در حوزه های اقتصادی، فرهنگی، اجتماعی، سیاسی، ورزشی، هنری و...) در جامعه
اقدامات انجام شده: عمده طرح های اجرایی در سطح استان براساس ابلاغیه های کشوری صورت می پذیرد. لذا لازم است معاتعت از اجرای طرح های تنش زا به صورت ملی پیگیری و ابلاغ شود. آنچه در حال حاضر بیشترین نارضایتی عمومی را در پی دارد نگرانی و ناراحتی مردم از تغییرات مکرر قیمت ارز و به تبع آن به هم ریختگی قیمت ها در بازار می باشد که سایر حوزه های فرهنگی، اجتماعی، سیاسی، ورزشی، هنری و ... را تحت تاثیر قرار داده است.	

Top Secret

7: Avoid implementing any tension-provoking plan (in the economic, cultural, social, political, sports, artistic, etc. spheres) within society.

Actions taken: Most implementation plans at the provincial level are carried out based on nationwide directives. Therefore, preventing the implementation of tension-provoking plans must be pursued and communicated at the national level. What currently causes the greatest public dissatisfaction is people’s concern and frustration over the repeated fluctuations in the **exchange rate**, and consequently the disruption of prices in the market, which has affected other areas such as cultural, social, political, sports, and so forth.

۳۸	مدیریت و کنترل نارضایتی های عمومی و اعتراضات اجتماعی	معاونت سیاسی، امنیتی و اجتماعی	استانداری (کمیسیون رصد نارضایتی های عمومی استان)
اقدامات انجام شده: دریافت موارد نارضایتی ها و پیگیری از سوی دستگاههای ذیربط، تهیه اطلس نارضایتی های استان و ارسال برای مدیران، برگزاری جلسات کمیسیون و پیگیری موردی و حضور در دستگاههای اجرایی ذیربط، تدوین دستورالعمل پیگیری نارضایتی ها و اجرا آنها به صورت منظم و مستمر در دستور کار می باشد و به جهت اقدامات انجام شده موارد قابل توجهی در استان ایجاد نشده است یا در کوتاه ترین زمان مدیریت شده است.			

38: Managing and controlling public dissatisfaction and social protests

Actions taken: Receiving reports of grievances and following up through relevant agencies; preparing a “grievance atlas” of the province and sending it to officials; holding commission sessions and case-by-case follow-up; and maintaining a presence in relevant executive agencies; drafting guidelines for tracking grievances and implementing them regularly and continuously are on the agenda. Due to these measures, no significant cases have emerged in the province, or they have been managed within the shortest possible time.

۴۲	ارتقاء اشراف اطلاعاتی نسبت به تحركات افشار آسیب زا و مقابله با فعالیت های هسته ها و کانون های شورشی و نفاق و گروهک های ضد انقلاب و معاند توسط جامعه اطلاعاتی	معاونت سیاسی، امنیتی و اجتماعی	استانداری (کمیسیون امنیت)
اقدامات انجام شده: دریافت و ابلاغ هشدارباش ها و پیشگیری از تحركات احتمالی، طرح موضوع در جلسات کمیته امنیت و شورای تامین و پیش بینی اقدامات کنترلی و مراقبتی منظم در دستور کار است با برگزاری منظم جلسات شورای هماهنگی جامعه اطلاعاتی و کارگروه های زیرمجموعه، تقسیم کار مناسبی بین اعضا انجام گرفته است که علاوه بر ایجاد اشرافیت اطلاعاتی، کنترل و مراقبت مطلوبی در هسته ها، کانون ها و افراد مرتبط وجود دارد.			

42: Enhancing intelligence oversight of the movements of high-risk groups and confronting the activities of the hypocrites' (*Monafeqin*-the pejorative term the regime uses to describe the MEK) cells and Resistance Units, as well as anti-regime and counter-revolutionary groups, by the intelligence community

Actions taken: Receiving and issuing alert status warnings and preventing possible movements; raising the matter in Security Committee and Provincial Security Council meetings; and planning regular control and surveillance measures are on the agenda. With the regular holding of coordination meetings of the intelligence community and its subordinate working groups, tasks have been properly divided among members. As a result, in addition to improving intelligence dominance, there is effective monitoring and surveillance over the cells, networks, and related individuals.

Appendix V:

Facts on the IRGC's Crimes Against Humanity

Attacks on hospitals and “finishing off” the wounded

Reports have been received of attacks by the regime's repressive forces on hospitals and the abduction of injured protesters from medical centers. Among them was an attack carried out by the repression forces on **Malekshahi Hospital**. There have also been reports of “**shooting the wounded at point-blank range**”, occurring **both in the streets and inside treatment facilities**.

Killing protesters by agents embedded within crowds

Reports from various cities across Iran indicate that the regime's security agents, who had positioned themselves **inside crowds in plainclothes and anonymously**, would identify active individuals and then **shoot them from behind** during demonstrations. Khamenei himself, in his speech on **12 Bahman (February 1)**, effectively admitted to this crime in a reversed manner.

Blindness caused by pellet gunfire

An employee at an ophthalmology clinic in Tehran reported that, due to pellet shots fired at protesters in Tehran, there have been **more than 3,000 cases of partial or total blindness**—including loss of vision in one eye or both eyes. **In Farabi Hospital alone, 1,100 blind individuals have been recorded**. To avoid arrest by security forces, the wounded are hospitalized and operated on under different names.

Transporting bodies with refrigerated trucks

According to reports from cemeteries in major cities, due to the large number of martyrs, bodies are being transported using **refrigerated trucks**. In **Kahrizak**, numerous images of refrigerated trucks carrying large numbers of bodies have been circulated on social media. In various cities, cemetery facilities have been filled with the bodies of those killed by IRGC forces.

Charging families of the slain for bullets

Based on the account of an Iranian citizen:

“This morning I heard extremely heartbreaking news. One of my colleagues... one of our girls, my children's coworker, was shot in Iran. She was killed. Her husband dragged her a very long distance and brought her home. Then, when friends called him... they asked why he didn't take her to the hospital or morgue. He said: Didn't you see what happened to our other friend? In Iran, they charge **500 million tomans for each bullet**, plus a box of sweets. Then they place two forms in front of you. One form, they tell you to fill out, says you must write that your loved one—write their first and last name—was a member of the Basij and that the ‘rioters’ killed them. The second form contains the names of three detainees, and they tell you that you must say these people killed your child and that you are seeking justice. I don't know how far this level of malice... shamelessness can go. How far? How far?”

Use of IRGC proxy mercenaries

Reports from various cities indicate that the IRGC, in order to fire freely on local populations, has used its proxy mercenaries, including Iraq's Popular Mobilization Forces (Hashd al-Shaabi), the Afghan Fatemiyoun, Lebanese Hezbollah, the Houthi mercenaries from Yemen, and the Pakistani Zeynabiyoun.

Diverting people's slogans by the IRGC Intelligence

According to dozens of reports from different cities, agents of the IRGC Intelligence organization within the IRGC and Basij attempted to divert the protests away from focusing on Khamenei by chanting slogans such as "Long Live the Shah" or "Pahlavi is coming back."

One eyewitness report from Haft-Hoz Square in Narmak (eastern Tehran) states that when the crowd was chanting "Death to Khamenei," several plainclothes individuals began chanting "Long Live the Shah," and they attacked with a knife a person who was actively trying to lead the chant "Death to Khamenei."

Another report from Arak states that several individuals chanted "Long Live the Shah" in the city's main square, and the repressive forces did nothing to them.

Another report from Tehran states that agents who opened fire on protesters at the front of the crowd did not interfere with several individuals who were chanting in favor of the Shah.

Opening fire on people with machine guns

According to reports, armored vehicles equipped with machine guns have been deployed at key points and major squares in large cities such as Tehran, Shiraz, Isfahan, Tabriz, and Mashhad. Machine-gun fire directed at demonstrators has been reported from various cities across Iran. In some cities, semi-heavy weapons such as the DShK heavy machine gun have been used to open fire on civilians.




Appendix VI

Schematic of the Chain of Command for Suppressing the Uprising

Ali Khamenei, as the commander-in-chief of the armed forces of the clerical regime, stands at the top of the repression apparatus. Within Khamenei's office, the **Security-Intelligence Office**, headed by cleric **Ali-Asghar Hejazi**, controls all of the regime's security affairs.

According to the schematic below, Ali Khamenei has positioned the regime's **General Staff of the Armed Forces**, centered on the **Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)**, with the mission of suppressing the Iranian people. Based on the security directives of the National Security Council, in security conditions **FARAJA** (Law Enforcement Command) and **VAJA** (the Ministry of Intelligence) come under the command of the IRGC.

The regime's **Supreme National Security Council** and the **National Security Council** also serve as the bodies that set policy and issue directives. The Ministry of Intelligence and the IRGC Intelligence Organization also play the intelligence role in repression. Coordination among the repressive organs at the provincial level is carried out through the **Provincial Security Council**, and at the county level through the **County Security Council**.



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